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On Educational Performance Measures
* 
 
Quantitative school performance measures (QPMs) are playing an ever larger role in 
education systems on both sides of the Atlantic. In this paper we outline the rationale for the 
use of such measures in education, review the literature relating to several important 
problems associated with their use, and argue that they nonetheless have a positive role to 
play in improving the educational quality. We delineate several institutional reforms which 
would help schools to respond “positively” to QPMs, emphasizing the importance of agents’ 
flexibility to change the way they work, and the importance of a sound knowledge base 
regarding “what works” in raising attainment. We suggest that the present institutional setups 
in both England and the US too often hold schools accountable for outcomes over which they 
have little control – but that such problems are far from insurmountable. 
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In recent years, quantitative performance measures (QPMs) have come to play an ever-larger 
role in the educational systems of both England and the United States.England has published 
schoolperformance tables (popularly known as “league tables”) since the early 1990s, and these 
tables have grown in both size (as governments added more measures) and in importance, both to 
parents and to policy discussions, over time. Over roughly the same period, the US has also 
introduced school-level QPMs at both the state and, more recently, the federal level. The federal 
efforts in the US, starting with the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act in 2001 and continuing 
more recently with the Obama administration’s Race To The Top initiative (both discussed in 
more detail below), have partially eroded the traditional federal deference to state and local 
control of primary and secondary education. In both countries, QPMs have generated both policy 
controversy and important new research. 
 
The demand for QPMs has its basis in the nature of the education production function and in 
government provision of educational services. In this paper we lay out the problems that these 
features of the educational marketplace generate and describe how QPMs might help solve them. 
We also describe several problems with QPMs as presently implemented. Along the way, we aim 
to convince the reader that QPMs cannot “do it all,” but that with appropriate institutional 
changes to better allow education providers to respond to the incentives they embody 
accompanied by a serious program of additional research to inform those responses, they have 
much to contribute to educational policy. 
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 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: We begin in Section 2 with a quick review of 
the institutional state of play in England and the US; this background sets the stage for our “big 
picture” discussion in Section 3 of the various reasons why one might want to introduce 
performance measures. Section 4 reviews several related literatures to see what support they 
provide to particular justifications for QPMs. Sections 5 and 6 address potential disadvantages to 
QPMs in the form of econometric issues and strategic responses, respectively, while Section 7 
briefly notes some other issues already well-covered in the literature. Returning to the big 
picture, Section 8 discusses other institutions that complement QPMs. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. QPMsin the US and England 
In recent years both the US and England have introduced high-profile systems of QPMs in an 
attempt to improve educational outcomes. In the US, the current national accountability 
framework owes much of its structure to the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001, which 
requires all schools receiving federal funding to administer standardized state-wide tests to their 
students.
1 Schools are required to assess the reading and mathematics performance of students in 
grades three to eight each year (equivalent to years four to nine in the English education system), 
with an additional test administered during grades ten to twelve. Schools must show that they are 
making “adequate yearly progress”(AYP) – though the definition of AYP is left up to the 
states.Parents of children at schools that fail to meet the AYP target for two years running must 
be given the option to send their children to a better public school in the same district (if one 
exists). Failing to meet the target for five years running leads to a school being “restructured” by 
the district – through closure,transformation into a charter school, or the hiring of a private 
company to run the school. 
                                                 
1See e.g. Peterson and West (2003) for more on NCLB. 
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Despite these federal requirements, states still retain ultimate control of their accountability 
systems, because the Act allows them to set their own definition of AYP, and to design (orselect) 
their own standardized tests.  
 
More recently, the Obama administration unveiled its Race to the Top initiative, encouraging 
states to compete for federal grants (potentially worth hundreds of millions of dollars) in return 
for implementing meaningful reforms to their education system. Applications for funding were 
judged on a range of criteria, with the heaviest-weighted elements being those relating to 
“improving teacher and principal effectiveness based on performance”.
2 Other heavily-weighted 
criteria aimed to encourage states to adopt cross-state (rather than merely state-wide) common 
standards in their assessments, to implement state-wide longitudinal measurement of pupils’ 
performance, and to foster the creation of charter schools. 
 
While participation in the Race to the Top was purely voluntary, 40 states plus the District of 
Columbia took part. Despite only 12 states ultimately winning Race to the Top funds, many 
more signed up to adopt common assessment standards in future,because by doing so they 
improved their chances of winning.Overall, then, the direction of policy in the UShas been one 
of increasing harmonization of assessment and accountability regimes across states. 
 
England’s move towards test-based accountability began somewhat earlier.The UK education 
system has always had nationally harmonized assessments at ages 16 and 18 (currently known as 
GCSEs and A levels, respectively), and in the 1980s many schools began publishing exam 
                                                 
2www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf 
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 results in their prospectuses. The system expanded substantially in 1991, with the introduction of 
standardized achievement tests for all 7 year olds in England’s state-funded schools (known as 
“Key Stage 1 assessments”), and later years saw tests introduced for 11 and 14 year olds (Key 
Stages 2 and 3, respectively). The results of these tests, as well as GCSE and A level results,are 
made publicly available, allowing the creation of school performance tables (the “league tables”) 
that enable parents to compare the performance of local schools. 
 
Initially England’s school performance tables contained only simple performance metrics, such 
as the percentage of each school’s students attaining five GCSEs at grades A* to C.Recognising 
the problematic nature of such ‘raw’ scores, which reflect intake quality as much as school 
performance (Goldstein and Spiegelhalter, 1996), 1997 saw the introduction of value added 
measures, showing the average improvement of pupils at each school between Key Stages 1 and 
2. These were augmented still further in 2007 with the addition of “contextual value added” 
scores, which adjust raw value added scores to take into account factors outside the schools’ 
control, such as pupils’ sex, ethnicity, first language, and family income (as proxied by their 
eligibility for free school meals).Despite the addition of the value-added based league tables, 
leading newspapers in England have continued to print only the tables based on outcome levels.
3 
High-profile problems with the marking of Key Stage tests in 2008, combined with ongoing 
opposition to the entire test-based regime by the teacher labor unions, led the government to 
abolish the tests taken by 14 year olds, replacing them with a system based solely on 
teacherassessments
4. 
                                                 
3 See e.g. the Telegraph’s GCSE league tables (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/leaguetables/8254332/GCSE-
league-tables-2010-school-by-school.html) 





3.Performance measures in the big picture 
What is the rationale for introducing national QPMs in the market for schooling, when so many 
markets in our economy(pencils, hamburgers, etc.) function perfectly well withoutthem? The 
question may sound glib, but answering it requires us to consider the important ways in which 
the market for primary and secondary schooling differs from other markets. Even before we 
consider the effects of government involvement, the nature of the product itself raises issues. 
First, in general, parents do notobserve teacher and school behaviour. This creates a classic 
principal-agent problem between the parent on the one hand and the teacher and school on the 
other.
5 In this context, the parent is the “principal” and the school and the teachers are the 
“agents”, retained by the parents to provide educational services to their children. This problem 
may manifest as the teacher not putting in sufficient effort in either the narrow sense of hours 
and engagement or in the broader sense of working smart by keeping up with developments in 
curricula, teaching methods and classroom management. It may also manifest as failure by the 
school to monitor teachers, to carefully match students to teachers, to hire the optimal teachers 
and so on. 
 
Second, as with doctors and auto repair shops, the parent consumer often stands at a 
disadvantage relative to the teacher and the school in terms of knowledge about how best to 
bring about the desired educational and later life outcomes. Economists call this an information 
asymmetry; see e.g. Oswald (1986), De Meza and Webb (1987) and Finkelstein and Poterba 
(2004) for evidence on the nature and effects of such asymmetries in other markets. This 
                                                 
5 See Prendergast (1999) and Dixit (2002) for classic discussions and Lazear and Gibbs (2009) for a textbook 
treatment. 
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 information asymmetry makes it difficult for parents to fully evaluate the inputs they do observe, 
such as the textbooks and assignments their children bring home from school, as well as the 
broader curricular and management approaches adopted by the school. 
 
Third, the outcome of ultimate interest, namely what sort of adult the child becomes, is not 
observed until long after much of the educational services have been consumed. Indeed, even 
many educational outcomes, such as high school completion and university attendance and 
completion occur years after parents make many of their educational choices. Contrast this with 
a restaurant meal, where payment does not even occur until after the good has been consumed 
and its quality revealed.Moreover, unlike restaurant meals, where a bad choice means that the 
patron is out a few dollars or pounds and where dozens of such meals may be consumed each 
year, most parents have only one or two children, and make a small number of large (and likely 
expensive, as they involve residential location) educational choices. This limits both parental 
learning and risk reduction via diversification. 
 
Worst of all, in terms of making choices about schools and teachers, what the parent really 
caresabout is not the outcome level, which reflects numerous other factors including the genetic 
endowment provided by the parent, the home environment, peer influences and so on, but rather 
a school’s long-run valueadded or causal effect on life outcomes. Valueadded refers to the 
difference that a school makes, relative to some counterfactual. While parents do eventually 
observe the adult outcomes of their children, they never directly observe the valueadded, even in 
the longrun. Rather, it must be inferred. This inferential problem is completely general and the 
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 difficult process of finding solutions to it underlies the large econometric literature on program 
evaluation; see e.g. Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999). 
 
The features of the education market just listed suffice to justify some government regulation of 
providers, such as requiring a teaching certificate for teachers, but do not directly justify either 
government payment for primary and secondary education or its direct provision. That we have 
direct government provision via the tax system, coupled with limited (though increasing in both 
the US and England) amounts of choice within the state system, raises two additional issues. 
First, an additional principal-agent problem arises between the voters and the government 
authority that operates the schools. Second, market discipline of schools, already limited due to 
the issues described above, operates indirectly residential choicesand elections rather than 
directly through parental choice (as it would in a private market with either vouchers or parental 
payments). Moreover, state schools pretty much never close, while private ones do. 
 
In sum, the education market differs from other markets in important ways, and would be so 
even in the absence of state provision of education. The nature of the educational product, the 
economies of scale that (usually) lead to its production in schools rather than at home, and the 
specialized knowledge that leads teachers to partially replace parents, combined with 
government provision, lead to a relative lack of market discipline and thus to concerns about 
whether or not providers have sufficient incentives to provide value for money.  
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 What can QPMs do to address the lack of incentives for educational agents – schools and 
teachers – implied by the nature of the educational production function combined with 
government provision of schooling? They can potentially do several things: 
 
1. They may induce additional effort on the part of administrators and teachers in the form of 
working harder and working longer; 
 
2. They may induce schools to make better choices regarding recruitment, training and dismissal 
of teachers and, not unrelated, they may alter the set of individuals who choose teaching careers; 
 
3. They may induce schools and teachers to make better curricular choices, particularly by 
paying more attention to the research literature; 
 
4. They may provide parents with information that allows them to better bring pressure to bear 
on under-performing schools, whether via their voting behaviour, their residential location 
choices, their choices of schools within the government system in contexts that allow such 
choices, and via their choices to leave the public system altogether for either private schools or 
home schooling. 
 
4. Performance management, power and knowledge 
In order for performance measures to have the positive effects posited in the preceding section, 
schools and teachers must have two things: the power to make choices that will affect the 
performance measures and the knowledge to make good choices rather than bad ones. 
9 
 Forexample, QPMs will not improve the quality of teachers hired if, e.g., principals (or head 
teachers, in the UK vernacular) must hire from among the qualified teachers the one with the 
most seniority or if principals have no idea how to distinguish a good teacher from a bad one and 
so choose the candidate who will provide the best lunchtime conversation.With the above 
discussion in mind, we now consider the degree to which principals and teachers in the US and 
England have the power, and the knowledge, to respond positively to QPMs. 
 
4.1 Power 
In the US, the degree of flexibility enjoyed by teachers and principals varies significantly 
between states, between different school districts within each state, and between schools of 
different types. To a first approximation, the rules governing matters such as teacher recruitment, 
pay scales, the conditions in which teachers work, and the curriculum they are expected to teach 
in US public schools are the result of decisions made by (at least) three levels of governance: the 
school district (often in negotiation with teachers’ unions), the state government and (to a lesser 
extent) the federal government. The balance of power between the school district and the state 
varies substantially between states, however, with some states allowing school districts to set 
their own teacher pay and conditions in negotiation with teachers’ unions, while other states 
forbid such collective bargaining, imposing pay scales through state-wide legislation. Neither 
arrangement, however, leaves significant latitude to school principals themselves, as these 
systems base teacher pay almost exclusively on years of experience. 
 
In regard to school type, the advent of public charter schools has led to important variation in the 
degree of flexibility enjoyed by principals in US schools. Charter schools typically escape many 
10 
 of the collectively bargaining limitations regarding hiring, firing, pay and conditions that bind 
other public schools (see e.g. Abdulkadirogluet al, 2010), though the particulars vary widely 
among the states. Principals in such schools enjoy greater freedoms than their peers in regular 
public schools. 
 
In England, unlike the US, head teachers’ flexibility does not vary a great deal from one region 
to another. Local Authorities (LAs), England’s closest analogue to school districts, generally do 
not have the power to set their own teacher pay and conditions, which are instead agreed by the 
national government and the teachers’ unions.The majority of state-funded schools in England 
are so-called “community schools,” which are subject to a reasonably large degree of LA 
oversight. These schools receive their funding according to formulae set by their LA, and use 
central services (such as admissions processes) provided by their LA. They must also adhere to a 
raft of nationally determined agreements and constraints: teaching within the confines of 
England’s National Curriculum, and adhering to a national system of teacher pay and conditions 
(agreed each year with the major teachers unions). 
 
Just like the US, however, different types of schools enjoy varying degrees of freedom to deviate 
from these collective agreements. Successive governments have introduced a range of alternative 
school types to the English system – from “voluntary aided schools” to “grant maintained 
schools” to “trust schools” - all enjoying varying degrees of freedom from LA control. The latest 
(and fastest growing) iteration of this idea is the new class of “academy schools” (a sort of 
English version of charter schools), introduced in the year 2000,with the authority to diverge 
from both collective wage agreements and from the National Curriculum. The head teachers in 
11 
 these school types, just like their charter school counterparts in the US, generally enjoy 
significantly greater freedoms than their peers in standard community schools. 
 
4.2Choosing teachers 
The recent literature suggests that teachers matter a lot to educational outcomes. We might 
summarize the conclusions of this literature as (i) teachers vary in their effectiveness, and (ii) the 
magnitude of this variation implies that an excellent teacher can overcome deficits due to poor 
family background and other factors. Among the more recent studies, Rivkin et al. (2005), using 
data from Texas, estimate that a one standard deviation improvement in teacher quality (as 
measured by value added) corresponds to a class size reduction of more than ten students. 
Aaronson et al. (2007), using data from Chicago public schools, estimate that a one standard 
deviation improvement in teacher quality raises student mathematics scores by one fifth of the 
average yearly gains, while Slater et al. (2009), using data on English schools, find even higher 
variability in teacher effectiveness, with a one standard deviation improvement in teacher quality 
raising GCSE test scores by at least 25% of a standard deviation. 
 
Given that teachers matter so much to outcomes, the ability to identify, recruit and retain highly 
effective teachers (and the ability to reform or fire ineffective ones) is one of the key powers 
wielded by a school principal. In practice, however, two formidable obstacles limit the exercise 
of this power. The first obstacle is the difficulty in identifying strong teachers to recruit. The 
literature provides persuasive evidence that teaching effectiveness varies only weakly with 
observed teacher characteristics, with the exception of experience. For example, Kane et al. 
(2007) find that teachers’ academic backgrounds, including their undergraduate GPA and the 
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 selectivity of their undergraduate institution, do not have predictive power for their value added, 
but that effectiveness improves with the first few years of experience. Aaronson et al. (2007)and 
Slater et al. (2009) reach similar conclusions using different data. Rockoff et al (2011) attempt an 
even more radical approach – administering an in-depth survey to new teachers in New York 
City, including a range of non-traditional measures such as personality traits, feelings of self-
efficacy and cognitive ability – yet find that few of these measures are significantly correlated 
with subsequent teacher effectiveness. Contrary findings come from Clotfelter et al. (2007), 
using administrative data from North Carolina,who do find a meaningful effect of both teacher 
qualifications and teacher test scores on teachingperformance, with the effect being greater for 
mathematics scores than for reading.Encouragingly, Rockoff and Speroni (2010) find that 
evaluations of prospective teachers based on long interviews (including mock lessons) also have 
predictive power for teachers’ subsequent effectiveness. Nonetheless, the weight of evidence 
from this literature suggests that high quality teachers are easier to identify ex postthan they are 
to recruit based on their CVs. 
 
At retention time, principals can supplement observed teacher characteristics with their own 
direct observations of the teacher in making decisions about which teachers to let go. Jacob and 
Lefgren (2005) provide encouraging evidence on this dimension, comparing school principals’ 
subjective assessments of teachers with the traditional determinants of teacher compensation 
(teacher’s level of education and experience) as well as measures of valueadded.They find that 
subjective principal assessmentspredict teacher performance significantly better than education 
or experience, though not as well as valueadded quality measures. In particular, principals appear 
13 
 to be able to identify the teachers with the very best and worst valueadded, but are less able to 
distinguish between teachers towards the middle of the distribution
6, 
 
In summary, the literature suggests that hiring teachers presents a difficult problem to principals, 
given that we presently lack the knowledge to predict teacher effectiveness based on observed 
characteristics. This highlightsthe value of developing instruments better able to accomplish this 
important sorting task. On the other hand, some evidence suggests that principals can identify 
their least effective teachers so that, if they have discretion over retention, they can use that 
power to raise average teacher quality in their school. 
 
The second obstacle to principals’ exercising freedom in recruitment and retention of strong 
teachers is institutional: in both the US and England, powerful teachers’ unions constrain 
principals’ ability to reward strong teachers and to fire weak ones. Teacher salaries in both 
countries remain determined almost entirely by teachers’ years of tenure (rather than, say, their 
observed effectiveness, or the supply of teachers with particular skills). England experimented 
with the introduction of ‘performance related pay’ in the early 2000s, but in practice the system 
operated as a pay rise for all teachers (Atkinson et al., 2004), rather than a reward for the very 
best, and the rigid system of automatic pay increases survived.Principals wishing to fire poorly 
performing staff also face substantial legal and procedural obstacles. While disciplinary 
procedures exist in both countries for the removal of poorly-performing teachers, they cost so 
much in terms of time and effort that principals almost never invoke them
7. 
                                                 
6Dearden et al (forthcoming) provide evidence that students themselves appear well able to identify stronger and 
weaker teachers – feedback that principals could no doubt make use of to supplement their own assessments. 
7 For England see e.g. www.guardian.co.uk/education/2010/jul/04/struggling-teachers-woodhead-claims-dismissed, 
for the US see e.g. www.newsweek.com/2010/03/05/why-we-must-fire-bad-teachers.html
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The salary and job security protections enjoyed by teachers make the hiring decision 
substantially more binding in the school sector than in the private sector. Employers in the 
private sector may have just as much difficulty identifyinghighly productive workers ex ante as 
school principals – but private sector firms have far greater freedom to adjust remuneration (and 
fire unproductive staff) accordingly. The inability to reverse hiring decisions in the (public) 
education sector, or to adjust remuneration in line with performance,means that hiring decisions 
have higher stakes than in the private sector.. All the more dispiriting, then, that head teachers 
will only discover whether or not they made the “right” choice when there is little (if anything) 
they can do about it. 
 
4.3 Choosing how to teach 
Do teachers have the knowledge required to become better teachers, if they want to do so in 
response to a regime of QPMs? Put differently, does the literature provide a settled, evidence-
based consensus about how to be a good teacher?Teacher characteristicsmay be only weakly 
related to teacher effectiveness, but are there nonetheless certain actions, methods or 
curriculathat consistently improve student outcomes?It seems uncontroversial to state that, at 
present, no such consensus in this regard exists. 
 
This lack of consensus is certainly not due to a lack of published papers on the topic. Decades of 
effort and millions of dollars of research funding have spawned a voluminous literature on 
teachers and teaching – but only a small fraction of this money supported statistically rigorous 
evaluations of specific, clearly-defined programsand interventions. Indeed, even analyses in the 
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 education literature described as “program evaluations” are often little more than surveys of 
participants. To take one example among many,consider the 148 evaluations of America’s 
“Teaching American History”program (which offerspleasant summer courses and workshops to 
high school history teachers) summarized by Humphrey et al. (2005). The majority of these 
”evaluations”rely on teachers’ self-reports of the effectiveness of the program.Only a quarter of 
them actually analysed the work produced by the students of teachers who took part in the 
program.Surveying the state of the literature regarding “best practice” for teachers more 
generally, Humphrey et al. echo Wilson’s (2001) argue that most studies suffer from a sort of 
circular reasoning: “Too often, the studies start with an assumption that they are examining a 
teacher with good instructional practice, describe that teaching and the teacher’s knowledge and 
skills, and then claim that that knowledge and those skills are the characteristics of effective 
teachers.  As a result, it is unclear from the research why certain teacher behaviors lead to good 
teaching, why certain knowledge and beliefs are associated with good teaching, and the kinds of 
knowledge that contribute to good teaching.” 
 
For the time being, this dearth of knowledge about “what works” in teaching reflects the abject 
failure of an entireacademic field, and seems likely to remain an ongoing obstacle to attempts to 
encourage educators to respond positively to performance management systems. 
 
5. Econometric issues 
The literature on QPMs in education highlights two important econometric concerns: 
imprecision and bias. Imprecision means that the estimates have large standard errors, which 
result from what economist Art Goldberger jokingly called “micro-numerosity” or, more simply, 
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 small sample sizes. Most classes are not very large. Average class size in the US is around 23 
pupils at both primary and secondary levels, while in the UK the average class size is 25 pupils 
at primary level, 20 pupils at secondary level (OECD, 2010). As noted by Kane and Staiger 
(2002), such small classes imply very imprecise estimates of performance for individual 
teachers, whether measured in levels or in valueadded. Aggregating up to the school level helps 
less in practice than one might expect, because most extant QPMs rely on exams given only to 
one grade level in a school, implying a school level sample size that is only a small multiple of 
that for a single classroom. Moreover, most extant QPMs use only a single test score, rather than 
having students take multiple tests so as to reduce measurement error at the student level. 
 
Wilson and Piebalga’s (2008) finding that almost half of England’s secondary schools have 
performance that is statistically indistinguishable from the national average (using contextual 
value added measures) follows immediately from modest school-level sample sizes. So does the 
Leckie and Goldstein (2009 and this volume) point that current valueadded estimates in the 
English system have only modest predictive power for estimates six years in the future. While 
some of this predictive failure results from changes in underlying school quality over time, most 
likely results from estimation error. 
 
Turning now to bias, we note that in addition to the basic point that QPMs, like those in the US 
under NCLB, often consist of outcome levels when we care about valueadded, even valueadded 
measures may embody substantial bias, depending on their construction and on the mechanisms 
that sort students into schools and classrooms. Rothstein (2009, 2010) lays out the econometric 
issues in detail while Kane and Staiger (2008) provide some evidence based on random 
17 
 assignment of teachers to classrooms in Los Angeles that certain contextual valueadded 
measures can do a good job of replicating experimental teacher effects in that context. 
 
In sum, small samples and single tests mean big standard errors for school-level QPMs. 
Averaging performance across years, testing more grades, and testing more than once can help 
with the sample size problem, but at a cost. The Kane and Staiger (2008) paper provides the key 
to solving the bias issue: do the research required to determine what you need to condition on in 
a contextual value-added model in order to get the right answer. Dearden, Miranda et al. (2011), 
in this volume,provide an example of this approach in action. 
 
6. Strategic responses 
Schools and teachers can raise their performance on QPMs by working harder or working 
smarter or by trying to “game” the measures in ways that raise their measured performance 
without improving their actual performance. Such strategic responses to QPMs are well 
documented in many literatures; see e.g. Courty and Marschke (2011) for job training programs, 
Smith (1995) and Kalman and Friedman (2009) for health care and Wallsten (2000) for research 
and development subsidies. 
 
Strategic responses take a variety of forms depending on the particular QPMs in use and on the 
legal and practical limits on school and teacher behaviour. For example, when the QPM consists 
of mean test score levels, schools may manipulate the set of students eligible to take the test, as 
documented in Cullen and Reback (2006), or simply encourage weak students to stay home on 
test days. When the QPM relies on a “threshold” of performance, schools may focus their 
18 
 energies on marginal pupils whose expected performance lies near the threshold, while 
neglecting both the strongest performing children (who will pass anyway)  and the weakest 
performers (the “lost causes”).Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) provide evidence that this occurred 
in the Chicago Public School system in response to the introduction of NCLB in 2002, while 
Wilson et al. (2006) show that some(but not all) head teachers in England willingly admitted to 
engaging in such behaviour in response to England’s league tables. 
 
Yet another possible strategic response to QPMs is to change the mixture of courses taken by a 
school’s pupils. If some courses make it easier for schools to do well on their performance 
measures, pupils may be encouraged to take such courses regardless of whether or not they are in 
the pupils’ long term interests. Jin et al. (forthcoming) provide evidence that this has occurred in 
England’s school system in response to league tables,and this forms a key concern of England’s 
recent review of vocational education courses (Wolf, 2011).  
 
In some contexts, schools, particularly non-traditional schools such as charters and academies, 
may have the leeway to attempt to “cream skim” students who will help them do well on the 
performance measures. Such selective enrolment has long plagued job training programs in the 
US. The incentive, and thus presumably the behaviour, arises mainly when using performance 
measures based on levels, as schools may have an easier time assessing likely outcome levels 
than assessing likely value-added. See e.g. Epple and Romano (2008) in an education context 
and Bell and Orr (2002) in a job training context. 
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 Last, but hardly least, the most straightforward strategic response to QPMs consists of simply 
having teachers cheat on the tests that underlie the performance measures, either by giving out 
the answers or by filling in or correcting the answers after students turn in their forms. Jacob and 
Levitt (2003) provide evidence of cheating in the Chicago Public School system. More recently, 
a widespread cheating scandal emerged in the Atlanta Public Schools (see e.g. Severson, 2011) 
and Dee, Jacob and McCrary (2011) uncovered manipulation in the New York State “Regents 
Exams” which certify a higher level of attainment than standard high school graduation. 
 
The literature reveals ubiquitous strategic responses to QPMs. These responses distort school and 
teacher behaviour, which harms students, and consume real resources. Minimizing such 
responses requires careful design and, as emphasized by Heinrich and Marschke (2010), will 
likely represent an on-going process as system designers adjust to the observed strategic 
responses of educators. 
 
7. Other issues 
Partly for reasons of space and partly because they have received a lot of attention elsewhere, we 
have avoided extended discussions of a few nonetheless important issues, which we briefly touch 
on here. First, and most important, stand the basic issues around solutions to principal-agent 
problems. If the government, acting on behalf of parents, seeks valueadded, then it should not 
reward outcome levels, as it does in the present NCLB system in the US. Here England excels 
with its contextual value-added measures, though it would do better to drop the levels measures 
entirely. Heckman et al. (2011) present a clear theoretical discussion of the issues associated with 
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 rewarding levels rather than gains in the context of job training programs; Balou et al. (2004) 
provide a discussion in an educational context.  
 
Another basic tenet from the standard principal-agent literature holds that if parents(or 
governments) want the agent to do several things -e.g. increase the student’s knowledge of 
maths, language arts, history and the arts - but only reward progress on a subset of them, schools 
will focus mainly on the subset and neglect the others.As Wilson et al. (2006) put it in their 
analysis of the English system, “what gets measured gets done”. 
 
Both the US and English systems suffer from this malady to some extent; remedies include 
additional performance measures or reductions in the rewards and punishments associated with 
the existing measures. 
 
Second, we have left to the side issues surrounding how parents use QPMs. Parents’ 
understanding of QPMs has implications both for presentation and for understanding the effects 
presenting them at all. We refer the reader to Hastings and Weinstein (2007) for further 
discussion and Burgess et al. (2010) for some evidence on what happened when Wales 
eliminated its school league tables. 
 
Third, we have not had much to say about heterogeneity, which matters here in a couple of 
senses. For one, schools have many dimensions other than the strictly academic, such as their 
level of discipline, the religious or ethical training they provide, and their athletic and arts 
programs. To the extent that parents care about these aspects, QPMs that focus solely on 
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 academic performance may not help them. Schools may also differ in terms of their ability to 
teach different sorts of students, conditional on the value that they add to their existing students 
(see Dearden, Micklewright et al., 2011, in this volume, for evidence in this regard). For 
example, of two schools with the same estimated contextual valueadded, one might do well with 
students who need remedial help and structure while the other might do well with very bright 
children. This is the primary and secondary school analogue of the mismatch problem addressed 
in the higher education literature; see e.g. Dillon and Smith (2011) and, more broadly on 




The discussion to this point suggests, in our view, that current performance systems in the US 
and England ask too much of their QPMs. This section addresses the question of alternatives or, 
as we would have it, complements to performance management via QPMs. 
 
First, flexibility matters. Principals with no control over personnel decisions, such as hiring, 
firing and salary determination, or over decisions on student admissions or ejections, or over the 
school’s broad focus or narrow curricular choices, have limited tools indeed with which to 
respond to the incentives implicit in a system of QPMs. Similarly, teachers with no control over 
which students end up in their classrooms or over curricular choices face similarly strong limits 
on what they can do to improve their performance. Relaxing some or all of these restrictions, and 
thereby providing agents with ways to improve their measured performance other than the sorts 
of gaming described in Section 6 should lead to better outcomes and fewer scandals. 
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Second, a knowledge base complements QPMs by providing the means for schools to improve 
their performance by improving what they do and how they do it. In the US, the Department of 
Education’s “What Works Clearinghouse” has played this role since its establishment in 2002. 
Like the Cochrane Collaboration, its inspiration from the medical world, it provides rigorous, 
evidence-based advice for U.S. educators.
8Its nickname, the “Nothing Works Clearinghouse” 
testifies to the volume of work that remains to produce a compelling evidence base in education. 
To the best of our knowledge, no analogous institution exists in England. The UK’s largest ever 
educational research programme, the Teaching and Learning Research Programme, is presently 
drawing to a close. Sadly, the £40 million spent on over 1,500 “research-informed” resources for 
educators and policymakers yielded only a small number of statistically rigorous evaluations of 
specific interventions.  
 
School choice, either within the government system or more broadly, empowers parents to 
respond to the information provided in QMPs and also, in cases where governments schools face 
enrolment and funding losses if parents fail to choose them, strengthens whatever other 
incentives a performance management system provides. Our view of choice as a complement to 
QPMs goes against the common, and we think misguided, view that choice and performance 
represent alternative roads to the same destination.Well-designed QPMs empower educational 
consumers to make better choices. 
 
Fourth, there exist other ways to motivate teachers and principals to work hard and to work smart 
besides QPMs. One consists of the professionalization of education, as discussed in the literature 
                                                 
8http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/
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 on educational sociology. The institutions of professionalization, which include but are not 
limited to undergraduate and graduate programs in education, seek to create and reinforce norms 
of behaviour that guide teachers and principals to do “the right things” even with no onelooking 
and even when they receive no direct reward for doing so. See e.g. Abbott (1988) or Lortie 
(2002) on professionalization. Related to, but distinct from, professionalization, is the notion of 
intrinsic motivation. Hiring teachers who love to teach and to teach well will help to obtain the 
desired behaviours in the classroom and the principal’s office. See Murray (1988) on intrinsic 
motivation for teachers and the related discussion, in a job training context, in Heckman, Smith 
and Taber (1997). Academic readers who doubt the importance of these professional norms and 
intrinsic motivation should consider why so many professors at research universities devote 
themselves to excellence in undergraduate teaching, even in the presence of zero (or even 
negative) financial incentives for doing so. 
 
9. Conclusion 
In a broad sense, this paper applies the more general analysis of James Q. Wilson’s (1989) 
excellent tome Bureaucracy to the particular case of primary and secondary education. The 
nature of the educational production function, with its long lags and expert inputs combined with 
the additional troubles brought about by large-scale government provisionmake designing 
institutions that make the best use of educational resources difficult indeed. The recent 
enthusiasm for QPMs and related institutional regimes of reward and punishments as a means for 
solving these problems flows naturally out of these difficulties, combined with declining costs of 
data collection and information processing. In our view, the present institutional setups in the US 
and England too often reward and sanction principals and teachers for outcomes over which they 
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 have little control, whether because the QPMs represent levels rather than value-added, or 
because they lack the knowledge or the power to effect real change. Not surprisingly, this 
situation results in frustration, conflict, and a lot of strategic behaviour.  
 
In many cases, the problems with the current setup would yield to institutional change and/or 
further research, the latter aided by improved data collection. For example, in both the US and 
England, central governments could require that states or LAs provide researchers with access to 
student-level data linked to teacher and school data (with appropriate institutional privacy 
protections), in return for funding. Such data, particularly when combined with information on 
variation in policies and curricula, would increase the pace of knowledge creation and help to 
relax the knowledge constraint on schools and teachers that want to do better, particularly if 
combined with deliberate variation in policy over space and time. Recognition that performance 
management may complement choice, rather than substitute for it, would also move things 
forward, as would, particularly in the US, a change in focus from QPMs based on outcome levels 
to QPMs more like the contextual valueadded measures presently in use in England.  
 
In short, while the educational context admits of no magic bullets, our analysis suggests many 
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